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to have $10 or $20 million in assets to offer a plan, Honest Dollar made
retirement plans available for just $8 a month per employee. 4
Honest Dollar embraced technology to offer automated investment
advice—a model some refer to as “robo-advisers.” 5 Honest Dollar provided
small businesses with retirement savings plans by focusing on the basics
and by offering low-cost passive investing options. 6 The platform relied on
Vanguard’s low-cost funds and gave “participants few choices about how
their money will be invested.” 7 In 2016, Goldman Sachs recognized the
business model’s potential and acquired Honest Dollar for an undisclosed
amount. 8 Today’s rapidly growing automated investment advice firms
make it possible for small businesses and even start-ups to offer high quality retirement savings vehicles to employees.
In recent years Wall Street firms have paid increasing attention to automated investment advice firms. 9 These innovative firms offer investment
advice through digital platforms. 10 Their websites allow users to complete
surveys about their preferences and financial situation. 11 The automated
investment advice firms then turn and use that information to create appropriately personalized portfolios. 12
Consumer interest in automated investment advice continues to grow.
One informed observer recently predicted that automated investment advis-

4. Id.
5. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) uses the term “digital investment
advice” to capture the same types of activities. FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 2
(2016),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8FK6KSF] [hereinafter FINRA, DIGITAL].
6. Cowley, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Liz Moyer, Goldman Sachs to Buy Honest Dollar, a Small Plan Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
14 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/business/dealbook/goldman-sachs-to-buy-honestdollar-a-small-plan-start-up.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/S5KX-89WU]. Similarly, BlackRock, the
world’s largest asset manager, snapped up FutureAdvisor in 2015.
9. See Alessandra Malito, In the Wake of BlackRock’s FutureAdvisor Deal, Which Independent
Robo-Adviser Will be Bought Next?, INVESTMENTNEWS (Aug. 27, 2015, 2:23 PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150827/FREE/150829915/in-the-wake-of-blackrocksfutureadvisor-deal-which-independent-robo [https://perma.cc/YD23-LX3A].
10. See Paul Sullivan, The Computer as Financial Planner, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/20/your-money/the-computer-as-a-financial-planner.html
[https://perma.cc/ZUF9-GGQS].
11. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 221 (2017)
[hereinafter Edwards, Conflicts] (“Financial technology may disrupt much of the traditional investment
advice business by allowing algorithms to select appropriate portfolios for persons that meet particular
characteristics.”).
12. FINRA, DIGITAL, supra note 5, at 3 (“Algorithms are core components of digital investment
advice tools. They use various financial models and assumptions to translate data inputs into suggested
actions at each step of the advice value chain.”).
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ers may manage $2 trillion in assets by 2020. 13 Today, the two largest automated investment advice providers now manage approximately seventeen
billion in assets while continuing to expand their capabilities. 14
These automated investment advice firms may disrupt and improve
the market for investment advice and finally allow modern technology to
make financial intermediation more efficient. 15 For a variety of reasons,
costs in the sector have remained abnormally high. 16 One study found that
“the unit cost of intermediation is about as high today as it was at the turn
of the twentieth century.” 17 The sector’s puzzlingly high costs have persisted even though technology “should lower the physical transaction costs of
buying, pooling, and holding financial assets.” 18
This article reviews the tremendous market-disrupting potential automated investment advice firms present as well as some challenges and possible roadblocks ahead. The article opens by discussing the conflictedadvice problem for the retail investing market and the cast of professionals
that now serve this market in Part I. In Part II, the article reviews automat-

13. TERESA EPPERSON ET AL., A.T. KEARNEY, HYPE VS. REALITY: THE COMING WAVES OF
“ROBO” ADOPTION 26 (2015),
https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/7132014/Hype+vs.+Reality_The+Coming+Waves+of+R
obo+Adoption.pdf/9667a470-7ce9-4659-a104-375e4144421d [https://perma.cc/87Z7-CHMT] (“Between shifts from traditional advisors and ‘new investors,’ [about] $2 trillion will be managed under
robo-advisors by 2020.”).
14. See Frank Chaparro, Betterment Has Taken Its First Step Into One of the Hottest Areas of
Investing, BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2017, 9:00 AM) http://www.businessinsider.com/bettermentsustainable-investment-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/GX83-QQ4W] (“Betterment, the largest roboadviser
with $9.5 billion under management, has taken its first step into the world of sustainable investing”);
Robo Adviser Wealthfront Now Offering Loans, Not Just Advice, INVESTMENTNEWS (Apr. 19, 2017,
4:37
PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170419/free/170419903/robo-adviserwealthfront-now-offering-loans-not-just-advice [https://perma.cc/9363-KCFA] (“Wealthfront Inc. said
in a blog post Wednesday that it will offer loans, calling the move a first among robo-advisers, which
are known for wealth management using automated investing platforms.”); Jason Zweig et al., Talk Is
Cheap: Automation Takes Aim at Financial Advisers—and Their Fees, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2016,
4:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/talk-is-cheap-automation-takes-aim-at-financial-advisersandtheir-fees-1501099600 [https://perma.cc/X5U2-WGQL] (“Betterment and Wealthfront say they manage
$9.7 billion and $7.1 billion in assets, respectively, up from $5.1 billion and $3.5 billion a year ago.”).
15. Financial intermediaries connect savers to investment opportunities. They include banks,
brokerage firms, investment advisers and others. For a definition of financial intermediaries, see Kristin
N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 187 n.2
(2013), who defines “financial intermediaries” as “privately owned and controlled businesses that
provide fundamental financial services to financial market participants.”
16. See Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577 (2015) (explaining
that “[b]ecause fees are revenue to the intermediaries to whom they are paid, intermediaries prefer laws,
norms, market structures, and other institutional arrangements that entail higher, not lower, transaction
fees”).
17. Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and
Measurement of Financial Intermediation, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1408, 1413 (2015).
18. Id. at 1434 (“A potential explanation is oligopolistic competition but the link between market
power and the unit cost of intermediation is not easy to establish.”).
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ed investment advice’s disruptive potential and explores some potential
regulatory and policy concerns about automated investment advice.
I. THE CONFLICTED-ADVICE PROBLEM
In recent decades, financial intermediation has changed in significant
ways. American retail investors only rarely buy stocks in individual companies. 19 Instead, most now purchase other securities—shares in funds.
These institutional intermediaries dominate the securities markets. 20
These institutional intermediaries compete against each other for retail
investor capital. 21 Often, capital flows to particular institutional intermediaries because of conflicts in the market for financial advice. 22 Many institutional intermediaries gather capital by making payments to financial
advisers when they steer their clients into particular investment decisions. 23
This system, and the players that operate within it, now contributes to the
retirement crisis.
A. The Retirement Crisis
For decades, “a three-legged stool” has supported Americans through
retirement. 24 Stable retirements were supported by Social Security, employer pensions, and personal savings. 25 As employers moved away from
defined-benefit pensions and toward offering defined-contribution plans,

19. See Anita K. Krug, Uncertain Futures in Evolving Financial Markets, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
1209, 1211 (2016) (“There are thousands upon thousands of mutual funds and other publicly offered
investment funds, which, as the dominant investment repositories of retail investors’ retirement capital
and other assets, have come to play a crucial role in the securities markets.”).
20. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009) (“The last thirty years or so have brought a rapid
shift toward institutionalization in the financial markets in the United States—in other words, a shift
toward investment by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, bank trust departments, and
the like.”).
21. Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 198–99.
22. Id.
23. See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement Savings and
the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 64 (2015) (“Financial advisers, including brokers (who have no fiduciary duty to their clients), make the problem worse. Most of them are
compensated based on (entirely legal) kickbacks.”).
24. See, e.g., Larry DeWitt, Research Note #1: Origins of the Three-Legged Stool Metaphor for
Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (May 1996), http://www.ssa.gov/history/stool.html
[https://perma.cc/8U7H-ZW93] (“Social Security benefits are described as the ‘foundation’ upon which
individuals can build additional retirement security through company or personal pensions and through
savings and investment. For many years, an older metaphor was used to make this point. Social Security
benefits were said to be one leg of a three-legged stool consisting of Social Security, private pensions
and savings and investment.”).
25. Id.
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the employer pension leg collapsed. 26 Without employer-sponsored defined-benefit pension plans, most retirees will depend entirely on personal
savings and Social Security. Unfortunately, the personal savings leg seems
unlikely to provide much support for most retirees. 27
Describing the personal savings leg as “weak” understates the problem. The United States now faces a looming retirement crisis. 28 According
to one recent survey, a third of Americans have no retirement savings. 29 In
instances where Americans have retirement savings, they often do not have
significant assets. Over half of the population has less than $10,000 in assets stowed away. 30 Financial insecurity may be particularly concentrated
in minority communities. Over half of “black and Hispanic families have
no retirement account savings.” 31
Americans approaching or entering retirement often fail to appreciate
the need for savings. One report found that Americans tended to significantly underestimate their actual need for savings. 32 Workers that do not
calculate how much they will need often estimate that they will need between $250,000 to $499,000 for retirement. 33 In contrast, workers that calculate their likely needs for a comfortable retirement estimate that they will
need between $500,000 and $750,000. 34

26. Richard L. Kaplan & Kate S. Poorbaugh, What’s the Matter with Retirement Savers?, 47
CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1314 (2015) (“Employer-provided pensions as independent income streams in
retirement rather than facilitated employee savings vehicles have largely disappeared.”).
27. See Amy B. Monahan, Employers as Risks, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 753 (2014) (“Perhaps
the primary risk related to retirement is simply the risk of inadequate savings. Individuals who are left
to make savings decision on their own may, for a variety of reasons, save at a level that is insufficient to
support them in retirement.”).
28. See Deepa Das Acevedo, Addressing the Retirement Crisis with Shadow 401(k)s, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 38, 38 (2016),
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4723&context=ndlr [https://perma.cc/X5W23JWH] (“[T]he retirement crisis may prove to be one of the most damaging developments facing contemporary America. It invites procrastination, it’s remarkably immune to class and industry distinctions,
and it’s actually two exceedingly complex problems.”).
29. Elyssa Kirkham, 1 in 3 Americans Has Saved $0 for Retirement, TIME (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://time.com/money/4258451/retirement-savings-survey/ [https://perma.cc/K5R8-XRAK].
30. Id.
31. MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POLICY INST., THE STATE OF AMERICAN RETIREMENT: HOW
401(K)S HAVE FAILED MOST AMERICAN WORKERS 17 (2016), http://www.epi.org/files/2016/state-ofamerican-retirement-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TTY-WS9Z].
32. ALICIA WILLIAMS & JONATHAN JACKSON, AARP RESEARCH CTR., 2014 RETIREMENT
CONFIDENCE SURVEY: A SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS FROM RESPONDENTS AGE 50+, at 8
(2015),
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/surveys_statistics/econ/2015/2014-RCSRespondents-50Plus-res-econ.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3NQ-8AYN].
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id.
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The need for personal savings may be particularly great for younger
generations. Many observers worry that the Social Security leg of retirement support will either collapse or offer reduced benefits in the future. 35
B. The Advice Problem
Although professional assistance from qualified financial advisers
might help many save for their future, most do not use financial advisers.
One survey found that only 28% of Americans surveyed worked with a
financial adviser. 36 The investors that do use financial advisers often pay
large fees, undercutting their ability to save for retirement. 37 The White
House Council of Economic Advisers conservatively estimated the total
cost of conflicted financial advice at $17 billion annually. 38
How much and how to pay financial advisers remains controversial.
Many financial advisers assist clients with far more than asset allocation
decisions. 39 Some help clients create savings plans and provide significant
counseling about how to achieve savings goals. A financial adviser that
provides poor and conflicted asset allocation advice while convincing a
client to increase her savings rate may cause a client to accumulate significant wealth—despite pitching high-fee products and inefficiently allocating
assets. In contrast, an adviser who provides high-quality asset allocation
advice but does not increase a client’s savings rate may not generate as
much wealth accumulation. 40
The available pool of financial advisers leaves much to be desired.
Many self-styled financial advisers receive commission compensation and
are paid to steer clients toward high-fee products. 41 The dangers posed by
35. See Doug Bandow, Commentary, Social Security’s Coming Crash: The Certain End of
Entitlement, CATO INST. (Oct. 20, 2009), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/socialsecuritys-coming-crash-certain-end-entitlement [https://perma.cc/3JEQ-52U7].
36. BLACKROCK, DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE: ROBO ADVISORS COME OF AGE 3 (2016),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-at/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital-investment-adviceseptember-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTB8-HZ8V].
37. See Anne M. Tucker, Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of Citizen Shareholders, 125
YALE L.J. F. 163, 181 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/locked-in-the-competitivedisadvantage-of-citizen-shareholders [https://perma.cc/J9PJ-4JW4] (“High fees can consume up to
thirty percent of an investor’s return on a thirty-year investment.”).
38. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE EFFECTS OF
CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (2015) (“the aggregate annual cost of
conflicted advice is about $17 billion each year” for retirement savers).
39. See Tom Baker & Benedict G. C. Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial
Services
Industry,
103
IOWA
L.
REV.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
16–17),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932189 [https://perma.cc/F5W7-WFBW].
40. Id.
41. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty and Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary
Duty Make a Material Difference?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 105, 121 (2014) (“These distorting incentives
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this type of commission-driven advice have been known to policy makers
for decades. 42 Because much of their compensation comes from selling
products, they may not have adequate incentives to provide competent
financial counseling and planning services
Despite the well-established dangers, ordinary investors regularly fail
to recognize real risks. Instead of realizing that a financial adviser may
receive commission compensation, more than half of investors in their
sixties or seventies incorrectly believe the adviser provides her advice for
free. 43 One audit study sent “mystery shoppers” with well-diversified and
low-fee portfolios to meet with commission compensated financial advisers. 44 Even though the financial advisers overwhelmingly recommended
switching to the types of higher-fee funds that independent experts counsel
against, most of the mystery shoppers left thinking that it would be a good
idea to use the same advisers to manage their own money. 45
Automated investment advice firms may mitigate the conflictedadvice problem and expand access to investment advice. The best platforms
will likely provide planning tools to help clients increase their savings
rates. By providing greater access to advice at a lower cost, these new firms
may reach persons that traditional financial advice firms have not yet
served. Of course, the quality of an automated investment advice tool’s
recommendations depends on the persons that create the automated investment advice tool. If large firms create automated investment advice tools
that simply recommend a firm’s own, higher-fee funds, automated investment advice may not result in improved asset allocations. 46

have long been recognized as creating material conflicts between the Broker’s interests and the client’s
interests.”).
42. An SEC committee noted the danger posed by these conflicts of interest over twenty years
ago. SEC, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES 7–8 (1995),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp.txt [https://perma.cc/C23K-4BK2] (“Of particular concern is
the practice of firms offering higher payouts when [financial advisers] sell proprietary mutual funds
instead of funds of a similar class managed by outside investment companies.”).
43. Ben Steverman, Why You Still Can’t Trust Your Financial Adviser, BLOOMBERG (June 7,
2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-06-07/fiduciary-rule-fight-brewswhile-bad-financial-advisers-multiply [https://perma.cc/Q3JT-JL25] (“According to a Cerulli Associates survey last year, a majority of investors in their 60s and 70s either aren’t sure what their fees are or
believe incorrectly that they pay nothing for advice.”).
44. See generally Sendhil Mullainathan et al., The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study
(Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
17929,
2012),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17929.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MRS-KRZG].
45. Id.
46. See FINRA, DIGITAL, supra note 5, at 6 (“Firm vs. client conflicts, however, may remain
present for both financial professional- and client-facing digital advice tools, for example if a firm
offers products or services from an affiliate or receives payments or other benefits from providers of the
products or services.”).
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C. Advice-Givers Serving the Expanding Retail Market
Much of the confusion around investment advice may flow from the
fragmented regulatory structure for providing investment advice. 47 Traditional financial advisers operate within a variety of regulatory structures.
The actual duties they owe to their clients depends on the type of product
sold, the compensation received, the source of the client’s funds, and other
factors. 48
1. Brokers
Commission-compensated stockbrokers (Brokers) regularly market
themselves as trustworthy financial advisers. 49 Even though most investors
mistakenly believe that brokers owe a duty to provide financial advice in a
client’s best interest, 50 brokers ordinarily only owe a duty to provide “suitable” advice. 51 The “suitability” standard allows financial advisers to sell
clients “suitable” investments—even if they are not necessarily in their
client’s best interests. 52 After a transaction closes, the law often imposes no

47. See Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment
Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47, 52 (2014) (discussing regulatory fragmentation); Christine Lazaro, The Future of Financial Advice: Eliminating the False
Distinction Between Brokers and Investment Advisors, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 381, 411 (2013) (“More
and more investors do not even realize that there is a distinction between brokers and investment advisers.”).
48. Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 47, at 49 (“In many cases, a single financial adviser may wear
several hats. In each role, the financial adviser owes different duties to retail customers depending on
the type of compensation being received, product sold, and locality.”).
49. See generally Joseph C. Peiffer & Christine Lazaro, Major Investor Losses Due to Conflicted
Advice: Brokerage Industry Advertising Creates the Illusion of a Fiduciary Duty: Misleading Ads Fuel
Confusion, Underscore Need for Fiduciary Standard, 22 PIABA B.J. 1 (2015).
50. SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS at i (2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX8V-A7YH] [hereinafter
SEC, FIDUCIARY STUDY].
51. FINRA, FINRA MANUAL, R. 2111 (2014). There are, of course, exceptions. Some states
impose a fiduciary duty under common law. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Eichler, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387, 403 (Ct.
App. 1985) (“The relevant law is clear. ‘The relationship between a broker and principal is fiduciary in
nature and imposes on the broker the duty of acting in the highest good faith toward the principal.’ . . . .” (quoting Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 236 (Ct. App.
1968)). Nevada also recently imposed a statutory fiduciary duty on Brokers consistent with the statutory
fiduciary duty it already imposed on financial planners. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 628A.020 (1993) (“A
financial planner has the duty of a fiduciary toward a client.”).
52. See Christine Lazaro, Fiduciary Duty— Now and in the Future, 17 PIABA B.J. 129, 132
(2010) (“[T]he suitability standard requires that a recommendation merely be suitable for a customer,
not necessarily that it be in the customer’s best interest.”); Patricia A. McCoy, Degrees of Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 551, 571 (2015) (“Because the duty of suitability is not a fiduciary duty,
securities brokers are not required to act in their clients’ best interests or diversify their portfolios . . .
Nor must brokers avoid recommending investments that will maximize their fees if their advice is
suitable otherwise.”).
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duty on a broker to monitor a client’s account or provide additional advice. 53
2. Investment Advisers
Automated investment advice firms and many traditional financial advisers register as Investment Advisers (Advisers) under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act). 54 Although the statutory text does
not explicitly create a fiduciary duty for Advisers, the Supreme Court recognized that Advisers owe their clients a fiduciary duty requiring them to
act in their client’s best interests. 55 In most instances, Advisers receive
compensation tied to a client’s assets under management. 56
3. Insurance Professionals
Many insurance professionals also characterize themselves as financial advisers. 57 Insurance salespersons (producers) operate under varying
state laws, making it difficult to state what duties they may owe to their
customers. 58 For some products, insurance producers now owe duties similar to the duties owed by securities Brokers. 59
II. THE POTENTIAL & PERIL OF AUTOMATED INVESTMENT ADVICE
Automated investment advice firms may accelerate the disruption of
traditional markets for investment advice and the market for asset management and institutional intermediation. 60

53. In some instances, Brokers will owe additional duties. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813,
823 (2002) (recognizing that the broker managing a discretionary account owed fiduciary duties); Leib
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (“[T]he broker
handling a discretionary account becomes the fiduciary of his customer in a broad sense.”).
54. See SEC, FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 50, at 16–20 (detailing state and federal Adviser
registration).
55. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
56. See SEC, FIDUCIARY STUDY, supra note 50, at 7.
57. Cf. Rules and Resources, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/rules-and-resources
[https://perma.cc/9U47-NJKX] (“[B]e aware that Financial Analyst, Financial Adviser (Advisor),
Financial Consultant, Financial Planner, Investment Consultant or Wealth Manager are generic terms or
job titles, and may be used by investment professionals who may not hold any specific credential.”).
58. See Lazaro & Edwards, supra note 47, at 68–71 (discussing insurance producer duties).
59. Id.
60. See Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 198 n.95 (“The market for institutional intermediation is the market for the services of institutional intermediaries. Institutions that manage capital compete against each other.”).

106

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 93:1

A. The Potential Disruption & Efficiency Gains
Automated investment advice firms may reshape wealth and asset
management. Traditional firms providing wealth management services may
struggle to preserve their profit margins while competing against automated
investment advice firms.
1. Disruption to the Market for Investment Advice
In most instances, providing reasonable asset-allocation advice to savers is straightforward and simple. Without any ability to confidently predict
market movements, savers should buy broadly diversified indexes. 61
Despite the ease with which suitable, well-diversified portfolios may
be constructed, traditional wealth management firms frequently charge
excessive fees for their advice. Paul Smith, the President and CEO of the
CFA institute, has explained that “[e]veryone knows we overcharge for
what we do. It’s obvious.” 62 Automated investment advice firms may disrupt these markets and put downward pressure on fees by providing assetallocation assistance at a fraction of the cost of more traditional firms. 63
The rise of automated investment advice does not mean that human
advisers will stop serving clients. Competitive pressure will drive human
advisers to embrace these automated investment advice tools to provide
services. 64 Advisers that do not embrace technology may struggle to compete against advisers that use technology to manage client portfolios and
gain the freedom to use their time to assist clients with other financial decisions. 65
Growth in automated investment advice services may now continue at
exponential rates, applying increasing downward pressure on prices. 66
While one observer predicted that automated investment advice firms
61. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J.
CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007) (“If you are acting with the most rationality, you will invest in index funds, which
hold broad baskets of securities and bonds reflecting the opportunities and risks faced by the market,
recognizing that it is nearly impossible to pursue an active trading strategy that will beat the market
over time.”).
62. See Steverman, supra note 43 (quoting Paul Smith).
63. See Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 221.
64. See Anne Tergesen, Robo Advisers Seen Exploding in Popularity, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11,
2015, 7:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/robo-advisers-seen-exploding-in-popularity-1449860367
[https://perma.cc/FGB4-YFXB] (quoting Michael Kites as saying that “‘in 10 years there will be two
kinds of advisers—those who use technology and those who are out of business’”).
65. Id.
66. See Zweig et al., supra note 14 (quoting financial planner explaining that it has “‘always been
questionable whether or not advisers were earning our money at 1% and up’” and that “‘[t]he spread’s
got too narrow’”).
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would manage $2 trillion in 2020, 67 others estimate the figure may swell to
$5 to $7 trillion by 2025. 68
As financial advisers increasingly rely on automated investment advice tools to provide asset allocation assistance, many will shift away from
collecting commission revenue in exchange for selling particular products.
A shift away from commission-driven financial advice has been underway
for some time because of regulatory pressure to address conflicts of interest. 69
2. Accelerating Change in the Institutional Intermediation Market
Changes in the delivery of financial advice drive changes in the asset
management sector. A tremendous number of actively-managed mutual
funds rely on traditional, commission-compensated brokerage distribution
channels to raise capital. 70 If automated investment advice firms continue
receiving fees primarily from assets under management or fixed annual
fees, they face less of an incentive to steer client assets toward underperforming actively-managed funds. 71
Significant changes in asset management are underway. Shifting assetallocation decisions by automated investment advice firms and others have
already begun to affect many asset managers. Investor assets increasingly
migrate from actively-managed funds toward passively-managed funds. 72
Ideally, assets will continue to migrate from active to passive management
until active management no longer reliably loses to passive management. 73
67. EPPERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 26.
68. Tergesen, supra note 64.
69. See Lisa Beilfuss, Who Is Winning with the Fiduciary Rule? Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
11, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-is-winning-with-the-fiduciary-rule-wall-street1502443804 [https://perma.cc/5XNM-T78H] (“Firms are pushing customers toward accounts that
charge an annual fee on their assets, rather than commissions which can violate the [fiduciary rule].”).
70. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Financial Advice Is a Thicket of Conflicts. Wall Street Wants to
Keep It That Way, WASH. POST. (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financialadvice-is-a-thicket-of-conflicts-wall-street-wants-to-keep-it-that-way/2016/12/28/0ec72e34-c6f0-11e6bf4b-2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.ebd28aed10a8 [https://perma.cc/E6H5-6VS9] (arguing that
reduced reliance on commissions “would kill the incentive for financial advisers to pitch lousy products
with embedded fees to their clients”).
71. See Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 201 (“In the market for institutional intermediaries,
picking losers is easy—as a group, the funds that charge high fees for active management are going to
suffer relative underperformance.”).
72. See, e.g., Aaron Black, Legg Mason: A Survivor in the Active-Manager Massacre, WALL ST.
J. (June 18, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/legg-mason-a-survivor-in-the-activemanager-massacre-1497817231 [https://perma.cc/CR8G-SXR7] (“So far this year, investors have
pulled tens of billions of dollars from actively managed mutual funds in favor of low-cost exchangetraded funds.”).
73. See Edwards, Conflicts, supra note 11, at 201 (explaining that the balance between active and
passive management should coalesce around a more efficient equilibrium).
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3. Efficiency Gains
Changes in wealth and asset management should create efficiency
gains for society. The asset management industry now rakes in approximately $88 billion in annual fees. 74 If automated investment advice firms
and other forces move assets away from higher-fee funds, the overall cost
of asset management should decline. As intermediaries capture a smaller
percentage of investor assets, investor gains increase.
Economic growth may also benefit from reduced fees flowing to financial intermediaries. Some research indicates that nations with bloated
financial intermediation sectors experience significantly slower growth. 75
Automated investment advice firms may reduce the overall amount of capital captured by financial intermediaries, freeing the capital for investment.
B. Potential Regulatory Concerns
Balancing the benefits of automated investment advice against its risks
will require cautious regulatory engagement. Effective regulatory responses
will require independence, as well as financial and technological literacy. 76
1. Systemic Risk Regulation
The exponential growth and potential scale of automated investment
advice firms have significant systemic implications. If increasing numbers
of consumers allocate their assets using the same or similar automated investment algorithms, wide swaths of the population could experience highly correlated losses. 77 Dominant automated investment advice firms
controlling massive market shares may also introduce new cybersecurity
risks. If a hacker caused an automated investment advice firm to suddenly
sell substantial assets, it could significantly disrupt markets. 78
74. MICHAEL RAWSON & BEN JOHNSON, MORNINGSTAR, 2015 FEE STUDY: INVESTORS ARE
DRIVING EXPENSE RATIOS DOWN 1 (2015), https://news.morningstar.com/pdfs/2015_fee_study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LD4-XGW9].
75. See Judge, supra note 16, at 575 (“[R]ecent studies suggest that the relationship between the
size of a country’s financial sector and the rate of its development is an inverted ‘U’—having a robust
financial system is critical for economic growth, but too much finance impedes development.”).
76. See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1310 (2017) (“Effective
publicly run digital intermediaries would require well-funded, capture-resistant agencies committed to
performance metrics and perhaps pushing the bounds of allowable governmental data collection.”).
77. See Baker & Dellaert, supra note 39, at 29–30 (“[I]f the models underlying competing robo
advisors are sufficiently alike, there is a risk of highly correlated losses that could even pose systemic
risk.”).
78. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1292 (2017) (“With
mass misinformation schemes, parties can manipulate the marketplace through fake regulatory filings,
fictitious news reports, erroneous data, and hacking.”).
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Despite the potential future risks, regulators should not move overzealously and subject automated investment advice firms to higher standards than those currently applied to natural persons. 79 Moves by regulators
to impose excessive regulatory burdens on automated investment advice
firms in the name of consumer protection or systemic risk reduction may
actually be calculated to raise costs for disruptive entrants and to protect
the profitability of existing intermediaries. 80
2. Shifting Regulatory Standards
Automated investment advice firms may also face risks from shifting
regulatory standards in the regulation of investment advice. At the present,
automated investment advice firms face regulatory uncertainty from multiple federal regulators. Changes in the federal regulatory environment may
amplify or diminish forces supporting widespread movements to automated
investment advice platforms.
a. The Department of Labor Rule
To address conflicts in the market for investment advice, the United
States Department of Labor issued a rule (the Fiduciary Rule) requiring
persons giving advice about retirement accounts to provide advice in the
best interest of retirement savers. 81 Labor’s Fiduciary Rule remains controversial and the Department of Labor has begun to reconsider the rule pursuant to a presidential memorandum. 82
While a modified or enfeebled Fiduciary Rule from the Department of
Labor may not directly impact automated investment advice firms, the
change to the regulatory environment may diminish the incentive for traditional financial advisers to migrate to different methods of providing advice. Without the restraint imposed by the Fiduciary Rule, many financial
advisers may opt for the high fees obtainable by selling high-commission
products.
79. Baker & Dellaert, supra note 39, at 3 (“At the same time, however, it is important not to overreact and not to set a higher bar for automated advisors than for human advisors. For now, the standard
against which automated advisors should be compared is that of humans, whom we know are much less
than perfect.”).
80. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017)
(manuscript
at
36–37),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2829592
[https://perma.cc/84RW-QWT3] (“[I]t is difficult to distinguish legitimate investor protection initiatives
from interventions designed to drive up costs for a potentially disruptive competitor.”).
81. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 10, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
82. See
Fiduciary
Duty
Rule,
82
Fed.
Reg.
9675
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-07/pdf/2017-02656.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE6T-YNG8].
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b.The Looming SEC Rulemaking
The SEC has also solicited comments about the appropriate standards
of conduct for Advisers and brokerage firms. 83 With rulemaking likely to
ensue, automated investment advice firms will need to adapt to a changing
regulatory environment. If the SEC leaves the current fiduciary standards in
place for Advisers, existing automated investment advice firms may qualify
as fiduciaries. 84
3.Conflicts
Automated investment advice firms also face conflicts of interest. Because of their potential ability to direct massive capital flows, many Wall
Street firms will seek to influence the algorithms used to allocate funds. For
example, plaintiffs recently filed a class action lawsuit against Morningstar
and Prudential raising issues with an automated investment advice tool
known as “GoalMaker.” 85 Plaintiffs allege that the GoalMaker automated
investment advice tool would “steer retirement investors . . . into high-cost
investments that pay unwarranted fees to” Prudential. 86 The complaint alleges that GoalMaker was presented to savers as providing “unbiased asset
allocation modeling” even though it actually “systematically influenced
[investors] to put their money into a variety of high-cost retirement funds
that paid excessive fees to the Prudential Defendants.” 87 If proven, these
allegations go directly to the worst fears about automated investment advice tools.
Automated investment advice firms may face other conflicts. For example, if their compensation derives from assets under management, they
may hesitate to recommend wise transactions that reduce their assets under
management. For example, if a client should acquire an insurance policy,
an automated investment advice firm might not push the need for insurance
as aggressively as an insurance producer would. Similarly, automated investment advice firms might recommend against paying down other debts
that would reduce their assets under management.
83. Public Statement, Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Comments from
Retail Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of Conduct for Investment Advisers and
Broker-Dealers (June 1, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-chairmanclayton-2017-05-31 [https://perma.cc/PLS7-R7JK].
84. See Nicole G. Iannarone, Computer as Confidant: Digital Investment Advice and the Fiduciary Standard, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV.  (2017).
85. Class Action Complaint at 2, Green v. Morningstar, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-05652 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3,
2017).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 5.
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4. Public Judicial Oversight
As automated investment advice firms capture increasing market
share, judicial oversight remains essential. Many financial services firms
now impose arbitration agreements and class action waivers on consumers. 88 If these agreements become widespread in the automated investment
advice sector, public courts may not be presented with opportunities to
update common law standards for a new technological context. Additionally, the public would also lose the ability to discover reputational information through public court processes. For example, if the GoalMaker
dispute discussed above had been shunted into arbitration instead of a public court, this article would not have had the opportunity to review the
complaint’s allegations.
CONCLUSION
Automated investment advice firms offer significant benefits. If their
platforms improve the delivery of high-quality, less-biased financial advice, their growth may unlock significant benefits. If these firms improve
asset allocation and induce users to increase their savings rates, they may
mitigate the coming retirement crisis. At the least, automated investment
advice firms seem likely to accelerate changes in the asset management
industry and to shift more investors toward passive investing models.
As these firms grow, regulators will need to grow their expertise and
capabilities to provide effective oversight for these new models. 89 To avoid
unwarranted regulatory burdens, regulatory oversight should scale with the
assets managed automated investment advice firms. 90 Because rapidly automated investment advice firms already manage billions, regulators should
fairly review their operations and devote resources to developing greater
competency as digital regulators. 91

88. See generally Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, NEV. L.J. (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3012246 [https://perma.cc/Z6JD-MDYC].
89. See generally Van Loo, supra note 76.
90. The SEC announced that it would scrutinize “robo-advisers” in its 2017 Examination Priorities. SEC, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2017, at 2 (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AJ8J-HFTZ].
91. See Van Loo, supra note 76, at 1323 (“To keep up, agencies will need to develop increasingly
sophisticated and automated tools.”).

